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At the meeting of the Joint committee on 9 June 1977 
in Luxembourg, the representative of SOmalia, Mr Mattan Hashi, 
proposed the appointment of a joint ad hoc committee to consider 
problems that had arisen or might arise in the implementation of 
Lorn~ I. 
At the meeting of the Joint Committee of 30 November 1977 in 
Maseru (Lesotho) the representative of Somalia, Mr M.O. Giama, was 
appointed rapporteur. 
The ad hoc committee considered the draft report at its meeting~ 
of 31 May 1978 in Grenada. 22 September 1978 in Luxembourg and 
26 January 1979 in Bordeaux. 
At the meeting of the Joint Committee of 31 Janu~ry 1979 in 
Bordeaux the motion for a resolution and the explanatory statement 
were unanimously adopted. 
Present: Mr Bersani, co-chairman, Mr Ouedraogo (Upper volta), 
co-chairman, Mr Giama (Somalia), rapporteur; Mr Andersen, the 
representatives of Barbados, Benin, Botswana, Burundi, congo, Ivory 
Cost, Mr Dewulf, the representative of Djibouti, Mr Fioret, the 
representative of the Gambia and Ghana, Mr Glinne, the representatives 
of Guinea-Bissau and Guyana, Mr Hansen, (deputizing for Mr Dondelinger), 
the representatives of Jamaica and Kenya, Mr Lagorce, the representatives 
of Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mauritius, Niger, Nigeria and Ruanda, 
Mr Sandri, the representatives of Senegal,the Seychelles, Sierra Leone, 
Sudan, Surinam, Chad, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, Mr Verhaegen, 
(deputizing for Mr Lucker), Mr Wawrzik, and the representatives of 
Zaire and zambia. 
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A 
The Joint committee hereby submits to the ACP-EEC consultative 
Assembly the following motion for a resolution together with explanatory 
statement: 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
on particular problems and difficulties that have arisen in connection with 
the implementation of certain provisions relating to the commercial aspect;; 
of the convention of Lome 
The ACP-EEC Consultative Assembly, meeting in Luxembourg from 
8 to 12 October 1979, 
-having regard to the report of the Joint Committee (Doc. ACP-EEC 11/79), 
(a) ~~~~~~~~~~~-2~~~~~~~~~~ 
1. Considers it absolutely essential for the Community to provide 
the ACP States with full and above all prompt infor-
mation on the preferences system to be applied the following 
year; 
2. Is deeply concerned at the way in which the special tariff advantages 
granted to the ACP States have hitherto been eroded and therefore 
calls for a system for conciliation and for assessing ~he effects 
of the generalized preferences system, and also for any adverse 
effects established to be adequately compensated by mutual agreement; 
3. Urges the Community, in view of the continuous decline in com-
petitive advantages, to help the ACP States to take corrective 
measures,in particular by improving trade structures and estab-
lishing an effective marketing policy; 
4. Calls for the continuation and strengthening of close contacts 
between the ACP countries and the Community before and during 
the negotiations in the context of all multilateral trade talks; 
5. Takes the view that the Community should ensure that it does not 
harm the interests of the poorest developing countries in extendLT.J 
the generalized preferences system; 
6. Calls for adequate compensation for ACP States which suffer erosion 
of their tariff advantages granted under the Convention of Lome; 
7. Considers that the time and quantitative limits on the arrangements 
under the present system are not in the interests of certain ACP 
countries because of the importance of their beef and veal exports 
and therefore calls for a satisfactory long-term arrangement in 
the new convention; 
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(c) Rum 
B. ~s not satisfied with the implementation of Protocol No.7, par-
ticularly as regards the consultations for which it provides, and 
hopes that the procedure for obtaining the necessary import licences will 
be improved; considers it necessary for the Community to consult with the 
ACP States to formulate a precise definition of run and calls 
for improvements in the areas of standardization of rum import 
statistics and explanation of the procedure used to determine 
quotas; 
9. Calls on the Community to consult the ACP countries before finally 
adopting the regu.tt•rion on the common organization of the market in 
ethyl alcohol of agricultural origin and recommends that 
special arrangements be made for the ACP countries in the 
proposed regulation; 
,:l) Bananas 
10. Deplores the fact that the Community has not yet fulfilled all its 
obligations arising from the banana protocol and therefore urges 
the Community to review its position; 
11. Considers it important for a kind of 'preliminary agreement' on 
the common organization of the market in bananas to be concluded 
between the Community and the ACP States, to ensure that the ACP 
States, and Somalia in particular, enjoy concessions in the matter 
of access to their traditional markets and are granted preferential 
treatment vis-a-vis third countries with respect to bananas; 
12. Is convinced that Protocol No.6 implies an obligation to grant 
investment aid to the banana sector, thus providing the banana-
producing ACP countries with additional resources, which could be 
used not only to aid individual banana-producing countries but 
also for specific projects in the banana sector of joint interest 
to the ACP countries; 
13. Calls on the Community actively to support the 'common organization' 
of the Banana producinq ACP countries, particularly as reqards 
adaotation of the market and trade promotion. and in this connection 
reqards direct contacts between ACP exporters and EEC importers as 
essential; 
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14. Requests that the Community should use those legal remedies 
available to it for dealing with any cases of unfair 
competition especially on the part of multinational companies, 
to safeguard the legitimate rights of the ACP countries; 
15. Asks the Community to examine the proposal made by the Ivory 
Coast's representative at the Joint Committee's meeting in Maseru, 
that when the new convention is being negotiated, an arrangement 
{e) ~~9:~!: 
for bananas similar to the protocol on sugar, and in any case giving 
the ACP States vital guarantees in respect of prices and quantities, 
should be included; 
16. Regrets that the sugar protocol has not so far been properly 
implemented and hopes that future sugar negotiations will take 
place in a spirit of trust and genuine willingness to cooperate, 
to the satisfaction of all the partners concerned, particularly 
since the sugar protocol is a cornerstone of the Lome Convention; 
17. Cannot accept that the Community should consider itself empowered 
by the protocol to amend price structures unilaterally, to fix a 
new intervention price and to present, as a kind of fait accompli, the resul tin 
figure to the ACP countries as its final offer of a guarante~d price; 
18. Asks that the guaranteed price for ACP sugar should be properly 
negotiated in future, taking account of all major economic factors 
in order to ensure economic stability and growth in the ACP countries; 
19. Recommends that the cultivation of sugar beet in the Community 
be kept at a reasonable level; 
20. Urges the Community, pursuant to annex 13 to the Lome 
Convention, to reconsider its decision on Zambia's application 
for accession to the sugar protocol; 
21. Urges the Community to sign the International Sugar Agreement as 
soon as possible; 
{f) ~E~!~-~~~-~~9:~~~e!~~ 
22. Hopes that the Community will continue to give the ACP States 
preferential treatment in respect of fruit and vegetables, even 
after the enlargement of the EEC; 
23. Asks that the preferences granted to the ACP for 
agricultural products should in no case be lower than preferences 
which will be accorded to third countries or under other agree-
ments; 
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24. Draws attention to the fundamental importance of trade 
promotion as a crucial starting point for the improvement of 
the economies of the ACP States and insists that the ACP 
States sho~ be able to take full advantage of the trade 
facilities provided under the Lome convention; 
25. Asks the commission to investigate, before conclusion of the 
new convention, to what extent Articles 12 to 15 of the Lome 
convention relating to trade promotion have been implemented; 
26. Emphasizes that the objective of financial and trade cooperation 
should be to improve both production, in terms of quality and 
quantity, and trade promotion; 
27. Regards the creation of a trade promotion centre and marketing 
offices, an adequate knowledge of markets, and the organization 
of exhibitions and trade fairs as essential requirements for 
trade promotion; requests the Commission to make available to 
the ACP countries in a simplified form all necessary documentation 
and information on products, markets, pricing, channels of 
distribution, advertising, etc. 
28. Considers it important to make every possible effort to facilitate 
and pro1note marketing coordination among the ACP States and to 
this end requests the Community to assist ACP States in every 
possible way. 
29. Further requests that consideration be given to the active 
promotion of tourism in ACP States bearing in mind that this 
'invisible export' has the same effect as the promotion of 
product exports; 
30. Believes that, bearing in mind the importance of trade promotion 
and the need for adequate financial resources, the question of a 
special fund, or some other specific scheme to further these 
activities should be studied. 
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I. Introduction 
B 
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT 
1. The Convention of Lome, which was signed on 28 February 1975 and 
entered into force on 1 April 1976 (the provisions on trade having entered 
into force in advance on 1 July 1975) , is valid for a period of five years 
up to 1 March 1980. The Convention was originally signed by 46 ACP States, 
but today 53 ACP countries are party to it, the seven new signatories being 
Surinam, The Seychelles, The Comoros, Djibouti, Sao Tome and Principe, 
Cape Verde and Papua-New Guinea. 
2. The Convention currently in force (Lome I) has resulted in various 
economic and social successes and improvements in the associated countries 
and all the partners have in general been favourably impressed by the 
experience gained so far with the Lome Convention. 
It should be particularly emphasized that in the course of implemen-
ting the Convention a climate of mutual trust among all the partners has 
developed. Furthermore, Lome I is regarded as an agreement that contains 
important development policy instruments, which are bringing about an 
improvement in relations between industrialized and developing countries. 
3. The Convention contains a provision to the effect that 18 months before 
it is due to expire, i.e., in September 1978, 'the Contracting Parties shall 
enter into negotiations in order to examine what provisions shall subse-
quently govern relations between the Community and the ACP States'. The 
Commission has already approved a memorandum on the renewal of the Con-
vention of Lome, which is to be submitted to the EEC Council of Ministers. 
In view of the time schedule mentioned above, the Council must decide by 
summer on the guidelines to be followed in the negotiations, since the 
formal opening of these negotiations is fixed for July 1978. At this time, 
i.e., against the background of the initiation of negotiations on a new 
Convention, which we may call Lome II, it seems particularly opportune 
to attempt an evaluation of some ot the experience gained with Lome I. 
4. For some time past it had been suggested during the debates of the 
Joint Committee that a special ad hoc committee be set up to deal with 
a number of practical questions. The representative of Somalia, Mr Mattan 
Hashi, explaining his country's proposal at the Joint Committee's meeting 
of 9 June 1977 in Luxembourg, stressed that when the Yaounde Agreement was 
in force some of its provisions had not been implemented or at least not fully 
implemented, with the result that some economic sectors of the associated 
states had suffered considerable losses. To prevent similar difficulties 
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arising and similar mistakes being made in implementing the Convention of 
Lome, he proposed that a mixed ad hoc committee be set up to study the prob-
lems that had occurred or might occur in connection with the implementation 
of Lome I. This ad hoc committee would outline solutions and submit a rep-
ort to the Joint Committee, which could then take practical decisions on 
the matters in question. Since Article 21(5) of the Rules of Procedure 
allows the setting up of a.consultative ad hoc committee on a basis of 
parity, the Joint Committee adopted this proposal in principle at its 
meeting of 9 June, leaving it to the Bureau to decide on the composition 
of the committee and implementing procedures. The members of the ad hoc 
committee were appointed at the Joint Committee's meeting in Maseru on 
30 November 1977. Mr Lagorce was unanimously elected chairman, while the 
Somalia's representative was appointed rapporteur. 
5. Obviously the ad hoc committee cannot be expected co concern itself 
with all aspects of the Lome Convention, on which the Joint Committee's 
general rapporteur, Mr Guillabert, will be drawing up a detailed report. 
The task of the ad hoc committee's rapporteur is rather to refer to some 
of the practical problems that are a source of concern to the ACP States, 
so that they can then be dealt with by the general rapporteur in the course 
of his review. 
6. The difficulties to be discussed in this document lie mainly in the 
trade sector. It must be pointed out, however, that solutions have already 
been found to some of these problems. Thus, for example, the objections 
raised by the Gambia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and the Sudan to the 
EEC provisions on the maximum permissible level of aflatoxin in groundnut 
oil-cakes, which the ACP States felt to constitute a non-tariff trade bar-
rier, have in the meantime been partly met as a result of the Commission's 
efforts. Hence, in response to the justified concern of the ACP States, 
it was decided, as announced at the ACP-EEC meeting in Fiji, to finance a 
research programme to support the efforts being made by the ACP States to 
eliminate the aflatoxin in groundnut oil-cakes (3,000,000 u.a. of the first 
tranche of the funds earmarked for regional projects was allocated to the 
programme on the basis of proposals made by the African Groundnut Council) . 
Nevertheless, there are certain sectors and products about which the ACP 
States are very worried. These are bananas, rum, suga~, fruit and vege-
tables, and generalized preferences. The treatment accorded to these and 
possibly other products is a matter of the gravest importance to the ACP, 
as the EEC has already introduced or intends to introduce restrictions in 
the ma~ter of various sensitive products. Reference need only be made to 
the footwear, steel and textile sectors. When submitting the memorandum 
on the forthcoming negotiations for Lome II, Commissioner Cheysson did not, 
for example, advocate an unlimited period of validity for the new Lome 
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Convention, so as to retain the possibility of reviewing certain provisions. 
It is particularly important, therefore, that difficulties that have already 
arisen in regard to certain products should be discussed and possible solu-
tions proposed. 
II. Some products and provisions which the ACP States feel have given rise 
to difficulties in implementing the Convention of Lome 
1. Generalized preferences 
7. After years of discussion the principle of generalized preferences was 
finally adopted at the UN Conference on Trade and Development in 1969. 
This system was to help make it considerably easier for developing countries 
to have access to the markets of the industrialized countries. The non-
reciprocal or non-discriminatory preferences would in particular help the 
developing countries to achieve an appreciable increase in export earnings, 
to initiate and develop industrialization and ultimately to expand economic 
growth. Generalized preferences, which were the expression of a new frame 
of mind in regard to world trade, were therefore intended as a means of 
achieving a long-term and fundamental improvement in trade relations between 
industrialized and developing countries, in order to bring about a more 
balanced economic relationship between North and South. The European 
Community, which was the first group of industrialized countries to put 
the system into force on 1 July 1971, has continually improved it in the 
meantime and constantly extended its field of application. The Community 
has also repeatedly stressed that it regards the generalized system of 
preferences as an integral part of its development policy. 
8. Generally speaking, the system of generalized preferences has not 
produced the results originally hoped for. Preferential tariffs were to be 
extended to as many as possible of the processed agricultural products 
coming under headings 1-24 of the Common customs Tariff as well as to partly 
and fully processed industrial products under headings 25-99. However, 
certain exports of importance to the developing countries were, of course, 
excluded from this arrangement; agricultural products in particular were 
denied this favourable treatment because of agricultural protectionism in 
many industrialized countries. Even the European Community introduced 
restrictions into its system. Thus maximum import levels (ceilings) were 
laid down, while the importation of 'sensitive' products, i.e. goods that 
compete with domestic products, is restricted by means of tariff quotas. 
Furthermore, a maximum import volume was fixed at the theoretical figure 
of 5~~ - in practice often only about 20 to 30% - of the total imports of 
any product given preferential treatment,and no single supplier can supply 
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more than this figure and still enjoy preferential tariffs. The 
question is, therefore, whether the words 'generalized' and 'system' 
should still be used when speaking of this 'system of generalized 
preferences•. 
9. Unfortunately, the truth of the matter is that economically better 
developed countries benefit far more by the system of preferences than 
economically backward countries. While the system of preferences was 
originally intended for the'Group of 77', countries that have attained 
a re·latively high level of development now also belong to the favoured 
circle. The weaknesses inherent in the system cannot be denied, when it 
is realized that five out of the 110 Third World countries enjoy 5~~ 
of the European Community's generalized preferences. The European 
Community should therefore adopt a selective approach in pursuing its 
trade policy, i.e. developing countries - if indeed they can any longer 
be so called - which have attained a high level of industrialization 
and whose products can compete on the world market, should be placed on 
a par with industrialized countries. In particular, the GSP should no 
longer apply to products that are manufactured by multinational concerns 
in the developing countries exclusively for export to the industrialized 
countries and for the sole purpose of exploiting favourable production 
factors, but do not help the manufacturing country to further its own 
development policy. The multinational concerns are at one and the same 
time importers and exporters, and their goods are merely processed in the 
country in question so that they can benefit by the GSPs. On the other 
hand, projects that help development and are important for the national or 
regional markets of the developing countries, because they help to 
achieve prosperity, should receive support. 
10. Ever since the Convention of Lome came into being the ACP States 
have been intensely preoccupied with the effects of generalized preferences 
on the advantages accorded to them by the terms of the Association 
Agreement. What is happening is that the special preferences granted to 
the ACP States in trade with the European Community are being offset by 
the generalized preferences in favour of the other developing countries 
in the Third World. This means in plain language that the ACP are making 
sacrifices to benefit the other members of the 'Group of 77'. This is why 
the ACP countries have voiced misgivings at meetings of the Joint Committee1 
1 See in particular the minutes of the meetings of 6/7 June 1977 in 
Luxembourg (CA/CP/19, 5 July 1977) and in Maseru (CA/CP/31, 10 February 
1978) • 
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and the ACP-EEC Consultative Assembly1 and spoken of the 'erosion' of 
the special preferences granted to them under the terms of the 
Convention of Lome vis-a-vis states that are not party to the convention. 
11. It is a serious matter for the ACP that their special preferences are 
bein9 eroded and whittled away by the generalized preferences. For 
historical reasons they are largely dependent on the EEC market for their 
trade. In fact, their trade with the EEC accounts for about 40% of the 
total, whereas the corresponding figure for the other developing countries 
is about 20%. In addition, most of the world's least developed countries 
belong to the ACP. The ACP countries have therefore intimated to the 
Community that their economies are totally unable to withstand a continuous 
undermining of their competitive advantages and that the Community must 
therefore do its utmost to protect the legitimate interests of the 
associated countries. In this connection it should be pointed out that 
at the Seventh Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly and 
the Fourth World Trade Conference in Nairobi all the countries represented 
stressed that the preferences already enjoyed by the ACP must be retained. 
12. It should be particularly stressed at this point that despite their 
own difficulties the ACP States have never questioned the system of 
generalized preferences and even welcome it as an important component of 
general development policy. At the meeting of the Council of Ministers 
in Fiji, however, they pointed to the specific character of the ACP States, 
which include most of the least developed countries, and called for closer 
cooperation in this matter, so that the effects of this system on the most 
important goods produced by ACP States might be established and the 
necessary aid measures taken. When granting generalized preferences the 
Community should feel it is its natural duty to ensure that the legitimate 
interests of the ACP countries are taken into account and that the con-
cessions they enjoyed under the Lome Convention are not reduced but 
retained. 
13. It must be admitted that when the Lome Convention was first being 
implemented, the consultation machinery between the EEC and the ACP on 
this point did not function very well. The ACP therefore requested 
consultations with the Community for the purpose of setting up a system 
whereby they would jointly and continuously monitor certain 'sensitive key 
export products' so as to determine the harmful effects the EEC's system 
of generalized preferences was having on the trade of the ACP countries and 
to allow any corrective measures to be taken to protect their interests. 
1 See in particular paragraph 15 of the motion for a resolution contained 
in Lord Reay's report on the annual report of the ACP-EEC Council of 
Ministers (Doc. ACP/EEC 5/77) and on current problems in connection with 
the Convention of Lome (CA 10 final), p.7. 
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14. The Community agreed to the proposal made by the ACP States on 
condition that the joint working party to discuss the effects of 
generalized preferences on ACP exports should be set up under the auspices 
of the ACP-EEC subcommittee on trade cooperation. At its meeting on 
23 November 1977 the Committee of Ambassadors agreed to the title 'ACP-EEC 
Working Party on the Effects of the EEC's System of Generalized Preferences', 
as well as to the mandate and membership of this working party, which held 
its constituent meeting on 17 January 1978. At this meeting the working 
party decided on its working methods, particularly with regard to 
communication of the statistics it would need to carry out its mandate, 
and enumerated the products, exports of which would be particularly 
monitored (timber, especially plywood, fruit and vegetables, especially 
tinned pineapples and other products that compete with Mediterranean 
products) • In accordance with Article 11 of the Lom~ Convention the 
Community informed the ACP States of its intentions with regard to the 
system of generalized preferences for 1978. At the meeting of the 
Committee of Ambassadors of 23 November 1977 the Community provided 
information on the progress made by the Community bodies working on the 
system for 1978 and particularly on the amendments made to the Commission's 
proposal to take account of the arguments put forward by the ACP States. 
On this occasion the ACP States said that by comparison with previous 
years consultation in 1977 had been more thorough and also more prompt, 
but they did refer to the cumulative effect that the annual improvements 
in the Community system could have on ACP exports. At the meeting of the 
ACP Council of Ministers held in Lusaka in December 1977 tribute was also 
paid to the improved manner in which the procedure for EEC-ACP consultations 
on 1978 preferences had worked, and the steps taken by the ACP-EEC Committee 
of Ambassadors to set up the joint working party were endorsed. The ACP 
Ministers stressed, however, that they expected a reply from the Community 
to their general proposals as speedily as possible, because their countries' 
economies must at all costs be safeguarded against any further extension 
of the system of generalized preferences. At the same meeting the ACP 
Ministers pointed out that the Community had committed itself to taking 
all the steps needed to safeguard the position of the ACP States, including, 
if necessary, the withdrawal of specificGSPconcessions. 
15. The views and demands of the ACP States may be summed up as follows: 
- They have signed an Association Agreement with the Community, which 
entails rights and obligations for both sides; they therefore consider 
it to be only proper and in accordance with the terms of the Agreement 
that each year the Community should inform them in detail and above all 
in good time of the system of preferences for the coming year, so that 
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any difficulties that may arise for particular countries and products 
can be discussed (in this connection it should be pointed out that the 
record concerning the Council decision of 6 November 1975 on the 
Sdoption of the system of preferences for 1976 included a declaration 
that these questions could be discussed at the request of the ACP 
States within the framework of the bodies established by the Lome 
Convention) ; 
- They regard a joint system for monitoring and assessing the effects of 
generalized preferences as very important; 
- They are deeply concerned about the erosion of their special preferences 
that has taken place up to now and about the cumulative effect of annual 
improvements in the Community's system of generalized preferences; they 
are convinced that the progressive erosion of their special preferences 
could also jeopardize other measures designed to further the economic 
development of the ACP States; 
- They are convinced that their precarious economicposition will not stand 
up to the increasing strains to which it is being subjected and, in view 
of the continuous diminution of the advantages they enjoy in relation to 
their competitors, call on the Community to take corrective measures, in 
particular by improving the trade structures and establishing an effective 
marketing policy; 
- They stress that their special preferences are being undermined not only 
by the generalized preferences but also by other measures, such as the 
concessions made by the Community under the terms of the Tokyo Round; 
the ACP countries therefore urge that close contact should be maintained 
between themselves and the EEC throughout the multilateral trade 
negotiations; 
- In general the ACP countries want to be consulted in future customs and 
tariff negotiations between the EEC and third countries, as a greater 
degree of agreement is necessary if the preferential position of the ACP 
countries, as enshrined in the ACP/EEC agreement, is to be safeguarded; 
since the position of the ACP has been undermined in the past by agreements 
between the Community and Third World countries not party to the 
Convention, care must be taken in all new agreements to ensure that ACP 
exports to the European Community are not affected; 
- Th~emphasize that six of the twelve agricultural products for which 
tariff reductions are planned under the Community's 1978 system of 
generalized preferences, are of vital importance for the export situation 
of a number of ACP countries and that the other countries that will also 
benefit by these preferences are far more competitive; 
- 15 - CAICP1431fin. 
- They feel that the Community should not extend the system of generalized 
preferences without restriction, but should be guided by the actual 
needs of the poorest developing countries, with account always taken of 
its speciul obligations to the ACP States; 
- If tha process of erosion continues at its present rate, the ACP feel 
tbat special assurances or concessions under the terms of the generalized 
preferences should be revoked. 
16. The preferential system governing imports of beef and veal from the 
four ACP countries,Botswana, Kenya, Swaziland and Madagascar, applies until 
the end of 1978. On 21 November 1977 the Council of the European Communities 
agreed, as in previous years, to extend for one year the special arrangement 
for beef and veal, which is mainly intended for the United Kingdom. This 
arrangement provides for a 90% reduction in import charges, provided the 
exporting country applies an export tax of a corresponding amount. Thus 
27,532 tonnes of beef and veal are imported annually from the above-
mentioned countries into the Community, the largest amount, 17,000 tonnes, 
supplied by Botswana. 
17. The ACP countries that export beef and veal have repeatedly stressed 
the importance of exports of these products for their economies. This is 
particularly true of Botswana, where over 80% of the population is 
employed in beef and veal production. For this reason the ACP countries 
concerned are not happy with the time limit on the arrangment, which runs 
for one year at a time, and call for a solution that provides for a longer 
period of validity. 
18. The ACP States feel that the concession granted by the Council in 
November remains in force only until December 1978 and, as far as the 90% 
reduction of import charges is concerned, does not allow for the increase 
in the amounts affected which in the opinion of the ACP States is envisaged 
under the terms of the Convention. The ACP take the view that a long 
longer-term solution is needed, continuing until the expiry of Lome I 
As regards the negotiation of 
Lome II, thought should also be given as soon as possible to the question 
of introducing a permanent arrangement for imports of ACP beef and veal 
into the Community. 
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3. Rum 
19. In general, the ACP countries are not satisfied with the implemen-
tion of Protocol No. 7 on rum, i.e. the commodities listed under heading 
No. 22.09 of the Common Customs Tariff (rum, arrack, tafia). The ACP's 
main crticism of the implementation of the protocol on rum was voiced at 
the meeting of the ACP-EEC Council of Ministers held in Fiji in April 1977. 
In Fiji, and even earlier, at the meeting of the Council Presidents on 
20 October 1976, the ACP referred to difficulties being encountered by 
certain importers in the Member States in acquiring the necessary import 
licences for rum from the ACP States. Since the authorities of the Member 
States are responsible for issuing licences, a technical meeting of the 
bodies in question should be convened, so that any technical difficulties 
may be overcome as quickly as possible, particularly if it is true that 
the issue of licences is being made dependent on certain conditions. 
Discrepancies in the statistical information on rum imports should also 
be eliminated as soon as possible, as the ACP partners have repeatedly 
pointed out that there are sometimes considerable differences between their 
export statistics and the import statistics provided by the Community. 
With regard to the Council regu~tions on the opening, allocation and 
administration of the Community tariff quota for rum originating in the 
ACP States, the latter have repeatedly complained that the consultations 
provided for in Protocol No. 7 are worthless, because they do notnormally 
take place until after the Community has already worked out the regulations. 
The ACP countries would also welcome a detailed explanation by the 
Community of the procedure used to determine the quotas for the Member 
States. 
20. With regard to the difficulties encountered by certain ACP countries 
in selling their rum on the Community market, discussions should be held 
between the partners concerned to determine the reasons for these 
difficulties and to work out a solution that is acceptable to all parties 
and takes account of their legitimate interests. For this reason it would 
also be a good thing if the new Lome Convention were to provide for a 
permanent joint group on rum, in which any problems that might arise could 
be thoroughly discussed before any decision was taken. Consideration should 
also be given to increasing existing quotas, so that the ACP countries can 
expand their rum sales in non-traditional markets. 
21. The ACP are well aware that it will not be easy to overcome all the 
present difficulties, as supply far exceeds demand on the alcohol market. 
In addition, consumption is not merely stagnating, but is, in fact,falling. 
Furthermore, many products are offered as rum, whereas all that they have 
in common with rum is the name. The Commission should therefore draw up 
proposals containing a precise definition of rum. 
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22. The ACP countries are also exceptionally worried about the problems 
that could arise as a result of the Commission's proposals for a 
regulation establishing a common organization of the market in ethyl 
alcohol of agricultural origin. They have already voiced their concern 
on this matter in the subcommittee on trade cooperation and in the 
Comm:tttee of Ambassadors, because they fear that these proposals will 
make it even more difficult for them to sell their rum. They would 
therefore like the community to consult the ACP States before it takes 
a final decision. They also feel that when the planned regulation is 
being adopted a special arrangement should be made for the ACP countries. 
4. Bananas 
23. Protocol No. 6 on bananas contains three important provisions: 
- As regards its exports of bananas to the EEC, no ACP State shall be 
placed, as regards access to the markets and market advantages, in 
a less favourable situation than in the past or at present; 
- A joint endeavour will be undertaken by the ACP States and the 
Community to devise and implement appropriate measures particularly 
with respect to investment encompassing all stages from production 
to consumption in order to enable the ACP States, particularly 
Somalia, to increase their banana exports to their traditional 
Community markets; 
- Comparable endeavours will also be undertaken to enable the ACP 
States to gain a foothold in new Community markets and to extend their 
banana exports to those markets. 
With a view to implementing the objectives of Protocol No. 6 a 
Permanent Joint Group on Eananas was set up, which has so far met four 
times. 
24. The ACP countries are not satisfied with the way the Protocol on 
bananas has been implemented so far, because they feel that it has not 
had any success. Trade in bananas at the present time continues to be 
based on traditional relationships, and the great change that was to 
have been achieved with the Protocol on bananas has not occurred. In 
spite of joint endeavours the ACP have not yet succeeded in opening 
up new markets in Community countries or in increasing their banana 
exports to any significant degree. Indeed, the question is what the 
ad hoc committee on bananas can hope to achieve with its modest 
resources against the giant multinational companies.A t~riff of 20% is imposed 
on imports of Latin American bananas into the Community, while ACP bananas are 
imported duty-free; nevertheless, the Latin American bananas are overcoming 
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this 20% tariff barrier without any difficulty. l\t <Jny rate their share 
of the European market has been continually increased. At the moment 
it is about 60%, and the fears expressed in 1975 by the main banana-
exporting South American countries - Ecuador, Honduras, Guatemala, 
Colombia, Panama, Costa Rica - seem to have been unfounded. The only 
conclusion that remains to be drawn, therefore, is that the 
implementation of the Protocol on bananas has not put South American 
exports at any disadvantage, and it has not brought any advantages for 
ACP exports. 
25. The ACP partners have repeatedly pointed to the considerable 
differences in the interpretation of Protocol No. 6. While the Community 
takes the view that it can exercise only a very limited influence on the 
banana market, since it forms part of the private sector, which is 
governed by the law of supply and demand, the ACP countries feel that 
the Protocol provides the Community with all the means it needs to help 
to increase ACP banana exports. At the last meeting of the Joint 
Committee in Maseru commissioner Cheysson stressed the private nature 
of the Community's banana market, but promised the ACP countries 
every support in improving the marketing of this product and protecting 
it against certain marketing methods adopted by the multinationals. 
26. From the very beginning of the Lom~ convention the ACP States 
have been intensely preoccupied with the Protocol on bananas. At one 
meeting after another of the Joint Committee proposals have been 
discussed that might help to solve the banana problem. In March 1977 
the ACP States forwarded a first memorandum to the Community, in which 
they formulated their views on the implementation of Protocol No. 6. 
From 9 to 17 July 1977 the Ministers of the banana-exporting ACP States 
met in Douala (Cameroon). Following this meeting the ACP States 
submitted a memorandum to the Community on 24 November 1977, explaining 
their point of view on the implementation of Protocol No. 6. On 
24 January 1978 the community made its views known on this memorandum 
through the Permanent Joint Group on Bananas, as it had done with the 
previous memorandum. Meanwhile, however, the ACP countries had sub-
mitted to the Community a memorandum adopted by the Ministers of the 
banana-producing ACP countries at their meeting in Douala, containing 
their answer to the community's opinion of June 1977. At its 14th 
meeting in Lusaka in December 1977 the ACP Council of Ministers dealt 
comprehensively with the decisions of Douala and adopted Resolution 
No. 21/1977/ACP, in which the community and the Member States are urged 
to take measures as soon as possible in line with the provisions of 
Protocol No. 6. The ACP Council also supports the recommendation 
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adopted by the Ministers at their meeting in Douala that a 'common 
organization' be set up to promote the sales of their bananas and to 
protect their interests. At the last meeting of the ACP-EEC Council 
of Ministers in Brussels in March 1978 the ACP countries again put 
forwar(1 their views on the banana problem. 
27. •rhe ACP countries are mainly critical of the following: 
·-· First of all, they feel that the Community has not met its 
obligations under the Protocol on bananas, because it still refuses 
to take the measures necessary for the satisfactory implementation 
of this Protocol; 
- They are not satisfied with the fact that their share of the market 
is barely 20%. They point out that three quarters of all European 
Community imports come from non-ACP countries and that six 
Community countries, which import 800,000 tonnes annually, i.e. 
44% of all community imports, do not buy any bananas from ACP 
countries. (The Community, on the other hand, holds that the ACP 
share of its market is about 25% and amounts to 116,000 tonnes 
annually, if imports from the Windward and Leeward Islands are 
included} ; 
- So far it has been possible to increase supplies only to the traditional 
markets of France, and the United Kingdom, while Somalia is 
still critical of the fact that a kind of excise duty is imposed on 
bananas in Italy and no adequate measures have been taken to enable 
Somalia regain its traditional share of the Italian market. Further, 
banana exports of the French overseas departments have been diverted 
from the French market into the Italian market; 
- They are ·worried that they are about to suffer losses even in their 
traditional markets and maintain that they are being put at a 
disadvantage in new markets by unfair competitive practices. 
28. With a view to improving their situation, therefore, the ACP 
States call for the following: 
- The Community should first of all meet its obligations under the 
Protocol on bananas, i.e. take appropriate measures to bring about 
an improvement in the banana situation; 
- A kind of 'preliminary agreement' on the common organization of 
the market in bananas should be concluded between the Community and 
the ACP States to ensure that the ACP States, and in particular 
Somalia, enjoy concessions in the matter of access to their 
traditional markets and are granted preferential treatment vis-a-vis 
all other imported bananas; 
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-Under a 'preliminary agreement' of this kind firm agreements should 
be concluded to assure the banana-exporting ACP countries of a fixed 
share of new community markets at favourable economic conditions for 
the supplying countries; 
An ACP-EEC group of experts on bananas should be set up to supervise 
the implementation of the agreements concluded; 
- They feel that Protocol No. 6, in which the Community undertakes 
to take 'appropriate measures, particularly with regard to 
investment', implies an obligation for the community to grant 
investment aid to the banana sector; aid of this kind should provide 
the banana-producing ACP countries with further resources over and 
above those envisaged in other provisions of the Convention, and 
these resources should be used not merely to aid individual 
banana-producing countries but also for specific projects in the 
banana sector of joint interest to the ACP countries; 
- They are convinced that improved marketing is the basic precondition 
for developing ACP banana exports and therefore urge the Community 
to support any measures that favour adaptation of markets and 
sales promotion; in particular they call on the Community to lend 
dynamic support to the ACP's •common organization' as a means of 
increasing banana exports and protecting ACP interests; 
- They consider it extremely important that to this end discussions 
should take place between the ACP exporters and importers in the 
Member States of the community; 
-The commission of the European communfries should watch the European 
market carefully for any unfair competitive practices on the part of 
the multinational concerns; 
- They are convinced that the community is adequately endowed with 
legal means of proceeding against any dumping practices and that 
it should do its utmost to protect the legal rights of the associated 
States. 
29. The Community, which has repeatedly urged the ACP States to 
pursue a more dynamic and aggressive trade policy in the banana sector, 
has in the meantime promised its full support for all measures and 
endeavours of the 'common organization' of ACP banana producers, and 
this has been warmly welcomed by the ACP. The EEC has declared its 
willingness to take action against multinational concerns when they 
fail to respect Community rules on competition; it is also prepared 
through the 'common organization' to make financial aid available for 
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the production and above all the marketing of bananas. At the last 
meeting of the ACP-EEC Council of Ministers in March 1978 these statements 
by the Community were welcomed by the ACP. 
30. At the Joint Committee meeting in Maseru from 28 November to 
1 December 1977 the representative of the Ivory Coast, Mr Ebagnitchie, 
submitted a proposal for the solution of the banana problem, which 
should be mentioned at this point. As there had been general 
dissatisfaction with the way the Protocol on bananas had hitherto 
operated, he suggested that when Lorn~ II was being negotiated an 
arrangement for bananas similar to the Protocol on sugar should be 
included. How far this proposal is realistic and what chance it has 
of being implemented is something that cannot be discussed any further 
in this document. However, at the same Joint Committee meeting 
Commissioner Cheysson said that a protocol on bananas along the lines 
of the Protocol on sugar, i.e. with guaranteed prices. was hardly 
conceivable. 
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s. Sugar 
31. Protocol No. 3 on sugar is one of the essential features of the Lome 
Convention and is of fundamental economic importance for the sugar-producing 
ACP countries. Furthermore, this protocol is a unique agreement, of a 
kind which so far exists only under the Convention of Lome. Nevertheless, 
or perhaps precisely because of this, the Protocol on sugar has constantly 
led to difficulties. Its application has been repeatedly and severely 
criticized by the ACP at meetings of the ACP Council of Ministers, the 
ACP-EEC Council of Ministers, the Consultative Assembly and the Joint 
Committee. Even the negotiations on the drafting of the text of the Lome 
Convention turned out to be extremely difficult precisely because of the 
sugar protocol. At the last meeting of the ACP Council of Ministers in 
Lusaka a resolution on this matter (No. 19, 1977, ACP) was adopted, in 
which the views of the ACP countries on sugar policy were accurately defined. 
32. The representatives of the ACP countries point out that the cultivation 
of sugar in the ACP countries is a European legacy dating from the earliest 
colonial times. Cheap labour and favourable climatic conditions had made 
the cultivation of sugar extremely lucrative for the Europeans, and this 
had even resulted in the neglect of the basic foodstuffs that had been 
cultivated up to that time so that today they had to be imported. 
33. The inclusion of the sugar protocol in the Lome Convention is a result 
of the United Kingdom's accession to the Common Market. In Protocol No.22 
to the Treaty of Accession to the EEC the Community undertook to safeguard 
the interests of those countries whose economies depended to a considerable 
extent on the export of primary products, particularly of sugar. One of 
the United Kingdom's conditions for accession, in fact, had been that 
Commonwealth exporters should be granted the same advantages by the Community 
for their sugar as they had previously enjoyed under the Commonwealth Sugar 
Agreement. After lengthy negotiations the Community finally agreed to 
buy and import from the ACP countries for an indefinite period a total 
volume of 1,321,500 tonnes a year ~nd not 1,400,000 tonnes as requested 
by the ACP). The ACP consequently regard the recriminations of European 
sugar producers as unfair, particularly since they hold that Community 
producers have suffered no loss as a result of the export quotas allocated 
to the ACP countries. On the contrary, they maintain that the accession 
of the United Kingdom has given Community producers an additional market 
for 500,000 tonnes, since Commonwealth exports to the United Kingdom 
amounted to 1,800,000 tonnes, while exports to the Community amounted to 
only about 1.3 million tonnes. 
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34. Because of the sugar surplus on the world market the ACP are very 
anxious to see the cultivation of sugar beet in the Community kept at a 
reasonable level. Unrestricted expansion of beet cultivation in the EEC 
would also have an adverse affect on the operation of the Protocol, as far 
as the price of ACP sugar is concerned. This is also clear from the Commission's 
answer to a written question put by Mr Vredeling, in which it says: 'In 
view of the surplus sugar production in the Community the Commission considers 
that it is still worth trying to reduce the total area under sugar beet. 
Any major increase in this area would undoubtedly affect the price policy 
for sugar beet which the Commission will have to propose to the council' •1 
The ACP thus criticize the Community for the fact that despite the 
world sugar surplus, beet production in the EEC increased from 8.6 million 
tonnes in 1974/75 to 10 million tonnes in 1976/77, while 1977/78 production 
is estimated at over 11 million tonnes. In addition, sugar consumption in 
the Community over the same period showed a downward trend (from 9.6 million 
tonnes in 1974/75 to 8.9 million tonnes in 1976/77). In contrast, the ACP 
have been granted guaranteed access to the European market for only 60% 
of their production, although their population has increased by 3% in 
the last three years and export earnings from the sale of sugar are on the 
decline. This is a matter of the gravest concern to the ACP, because earnings 
from the sale of sugar are the only source of revenue in some sugar-producing 
ACP countries and thus determine the size of their gross national product. 
For many families sugar is the only source of income and consequently the 
main source of employment. Furthermore, there is scarcely any alternative 
type of production in the sugar-producing ACP countries, and at best the 
alternative would take years to develop. Diversification in the ACP can 
only mean supplementing and never substituting sugar cultivation, while 
genuine alternatives are available to European sugar beet growers. The 
Commission has promised to do all in its power and has also pointed out 
that there has been a sharper increase in sugar production outside the ACP 
and the Community. But the ACP, who feel that the EEC is partly responsible 
for the worldwide sugar surpluses, demand concrete measures to improve or 
~abilize the economic position of the sugar-producing ACP countries. 
1 Written Question No. 47/71, OJ No. C 62, 22.6.1971, pp.B-9 
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35. Together with guaranteed access to markets, guaranteed prices are for 
the ACP the most important part of the Protocol on sugar. The most serious 
differences of opinion between the EEC and the ACP have arisen during the 
negotiation and fixing of the guaranteed sugar price, and the ACP are 
deeply concerned at the various problems encountered during the sugar price 
negotiations. 
36. Pursuant to Article 5 of Protocol No. 3 the guaranteed prices are negotiated 
annually on the basis of prices obtaining in the Community and with account 
taken of all the important economic factors, and are fixed at the latest 
by 1 May immediately preceding the delivery period to which they will apply. 
The prices expressed in units of account refer to unpacked sugar, cif Euro-
pean ports. The guarantee runs for a period of twelve months, i.e. from 
1 July to 30 June. This guarantee applies basically to sugar which cannot 
be sold on satisfactory terms at prices freely negotiated between buyers 
and sellers. The Community does not intervene where a Member State allows 
selling prices within its borders to exceed the Community threshold price. 
The EEC's intervention agencies buy from the ACP countries only the amount 
of sugar that cannot be sold on the free market, subject to the agreed 
upper limit. From the point of view of price policy, the price guaranteed 
to the ACP countries is linked to EEC internal prices, which are revised 
annually in the light of the prevailing economic conditions. From a 
trade policy point of view, the Community's guarantee of market access 
and sales for ACP sugar is intended to assure the ACP countries of the 
foreign currency earnings they need to carry out their development 
projects. In return the Community has guaranteed supplies without 
prejudice to the free sale of sugar on its markets. 
37. The ACP feel that in the case of sugar the objectives of the STABEX 
system have not been achieved, since earnings have fallen steadily. 
Furthermore, the guaranteed prices of recent years have not been sufficient 
to ensure profitability, stability and growth in the ACP countries concerned. 
For example, the current price of ACP raw sugar is 27.25 u.a. per 100 kg, 
which is an increase of 6.7% against 1975/76, while the current intervention 
price for Community raw sugar has risen by 11.7% since 1975/76. The ACP 
claim that the guaranteed sugar price in these last two years was far below 
the level that could have been reached if the Protocol had been properly 
interpreted. In the first case legal proceedings could even have been 
taken, because the figure fell below the lowest price in the Community 
price range. Under the terms of the sugar protocol the Community is 
required to take account of 'all relevant economic factors' in fixing the 
ACP sugar price. Although the ACP had pointed out that their sugar pro-
duction costs had risen by 33% in the first marketing year and 16% in the 
second, this was not taken into account when the guaranteed price was fixed. 
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This makes one wonder what significance is to be attached to the text of 
the Protocol, according to which 'all relevant economic facto~s' must be 
taken into account. The ACP are only asking for a fair guarantee price; 
they are not asking for the threshold price, but for a price somewhere in 
the middle of the Community range, rather than at the lower and of the scale. 
38. A particular difficulty in implementing the sugar protocol stems 
from the fact that negotiations with the ACP countries can begin only when 
the Community has fixed its own internal agricultural prices for the current 
marketing year. This year the Council will not take a decision before the 
second half of April, and if the ACP sugar price is to be negotiated by 
1 May, this leaves very little time. In addition, the negotiated sugar 
price should be applied retroactively, if important aspects of the guaranteed 
price are not to be eroded or even lost altogether. 
39. The ACP countries are particularly disappointed at the spirit in 
which the sugar negotiations have been conducted up to now. In particular, 
it must be admitted that the consultation procedure of recent years has 
been completely inadequate, since the Community has amended the price 
structures and the intervention price unilaterally and put the result to 
the ACP countries as a final offer. Indeed, when the negotiations on the 
sugar protocol had been completed, it was trumpeted as an unprecedented 
pioneering move that the Commission had to consult the ACP sugar-exporting 
countries before it submitted proposals for Community prices. We must hope, 
therefore, that there will be a change in these methods, so that the forth-
coming negotiations can be conducted under more auspicious conditions. 
40. Article 7 of the sugar protocol contains provisions on the measures 
to be taken when during a particular delivery period sugar-exporting ACP 
States fail to deliver in full the quantities agreed in the Protocol. 
These measures vary depending on whether the agreed quantities are not 
delivered because of 'force majeure' or for other reasons. A case of the 
latter kind arose in the 1975/76 marketing year when four ACP countries -
Kenya; Uganda, The People's Republic of the Congo and Surinam- could not 
meet their obligations. The ACP countries welcome the approach adopted 
by the Community at the Ministerial meeting in Fiji in April 1977, when it 
agreed to restore the sugar quotas of the four ACP countries in question. 
The Community did stress, however, that this concession was an independent 
political gesture, did not apply retroactively and was not to be taken as 
a precedent. Nevertheless, by taking this decision the Community did 
acknowledge the serious economic consequences of these measures for the 
countries concerned. The agreement reached between the Community and the 
ACP States at the meeting of the Committee of Ambassadors on 23 November 
1977 on a definition of the concept 'force majeure' and a consultation 
procedure in connection with this concept is of particular importance. The 
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reason why a definition of the criteria for establishing the existence of 
'force majeure' is so vital is that it will enable future difficulties in 
implementing Article 7 of Protocol No. 3 to be avoided. Divergent inter-
pretations of these provisions might do considerable political harm. 
41. The matters of concern to the ACP States as regards the implementation 
of the sugar protocol can be summarized as follows: 
- They hope that the forthcoming negotiations to fix the guaranteed price 
will be conducted in a spirit of mutual trust and sincere willingness 
to cooperate; 
- They consider it absolutely essential that the guaranteed price negotiated 
ensures stability, profitability and economic growth in the sugar-exporting 
ACP states, i.e. it must also take account of the rate of inflation; for 
this reason they want the guaranteed price t'b be f.ixed somewhere around 
the middle of the Community price range; 
- They confirm that the guaranteed prices for ACP sugar must be negotiated 
by reference to the prices obtaining in the Community, but insist that 
these guaranteed prices be applied retroactively, so that the advantages 
they create are not eroded; 
- They reject any application to ACP sugar of the storage charge agreed by 
the Community and feel that the freight rate should also be taken into 
consideration in the negotiations, since the ACP sugar price is reduced 
by freight costs; 
- They cannot accept the idea that the Community should feel that the 
Protocol empowers it to amend price structures unilaterally, to fix a 
new intervention price, to deduct any charges as it thinks fit and to 
present the resulting figure to the ACP countries as its final offer 
of a guaranteed price; 
- They are convinced that the text of the Protocol on sugar does not permit 
of this interpretation and feel that the guaranteed price for ACP sugar 
must be fixed jointly in the course of annual negotiations. 
42. Despite all their criticisms the ACP countries regard the Protocol 
on sugar as a solid basis for cooperation, particularly as regards their 
economic planning, their production and their export earnings. But they 
are not happy with the way the sugar protocol has been applied up to the 
present time. In Lome II, therefore, certain provisions should be more 
clearly formulated. They are concerned at the fact that basically no genuine 
negotiations have ever taken place and that they have always been presented 
with a fait accompli. All they ask is that an attempt ahould be made to 
understand their concern and to apply the Protocol in accordance with both 
the spirit and the letter. Adequate and fair prices must be worked out 
for their sugar production. If properly applied, the sugar protocol is 
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not only a cornerstone of the Lome Association but can, in the light of 
the present problems in regard to raw materials, become a model for coopera-
tion between industrialized countries and developing countries, which often 
have nothing to export but their raw materials. 
43. The ACP and the EEC differ substantially on the question of Zambia's 
application for accession to the sugar protocol (when the Protocol was 
negotiated Zambia was not a sugar-producing country). The EEC points 
out that Protocol No.3 lays down precise quantities; unless the other sugar-
producing ACP countries are prepared to surrender part of their own quotas 
to Zambia (the amount in question is 15,000 tonnes), it may not at present 
accede to the Protocol. Zambia cannot be included in the list of sugar-
producing countries contained in the sugar protocol until a new protocol 
is ·negotiated (Protocol No.3 is valid for one year longer than the Lome 
Convention. The Commission feels that there are legal difficulties in 
this matter, as the sugar protocol does not allow for a later increase in 
the number of countries party to it. The ACP States, on the other hand, 
refer to the joint declaration contained in Annex XIII to the Lome Convention 
and reject the Community's legal arguments. In the resolution on sugar 
adopted by the ACP Council of Ministers in Lusaka the Community is therefore 
'urged to accelerate its consideration of the application by Zambia for 
a quota umder the sugar protocol'. 
44. The EEC is not a party to the new agreement on sugar which was concluded 
in Geneva on 7 October 1977 at the UN sugar conference attended by 70 countries. 
This agreement is valid for a period of 5 years and to all intents and 
purposes has been in force since the beginning of this year. The Community 
has kept the question of its participation in the agreement open and has 
managed to have a provision included whereby it can become a party to the 
agreement at a later date under special conditions which have yet to be 
negotiated. The reason it is not yet party to the agreement is the quota 
arrangement, the Community regarding the export quotas allotted to it as 
being too small. After all, it is second only to Cuba among the world's 
exporters: in the current marketing year it will have to sell about 1.7 
million tonnes of sugar on the world market from its own production or 
surplus production. Two compromises offered by the Community have not 
been accepted, and it was pointed out that the Community was not a tradition-
al sugar exporter and should leave sugar-exporting to the developing 
countries and cut back its production. 
45. Should the Community not become a party to the international sugar 
agreement, disadvantages could arise for the sugar-exporting ACP countries 
and their sales on world markets, and also for the Community itself. The 
ACP countries therefore hope that in the interest of both partners the 
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Community will soon sign the sugar agreement. Resolution No.l9/77/ACP 
adopted by the ACP Council of Ministers in Lusaka echoes these sentiments. 
6. Fruit and vegetables 
46. The ACP regard it as extremely important for their economic develop-
ment that, as regards trade in fruit and vegetables, they should retain 
their advantageous position vis-a-vis other countries in the Mediterranean 
area with which the European Community has established special relations. 
They stress that the Lome Convention and the agreements concluded with the 
Maghreb and Mashreq countries are based on different premisses. They in 
no way question the political significance of the Mediterranean agreements, 
but they feel that greater importance must be attached to the trade questions 
governed by the Convention of Lome. Most of the world's poorest 
countries belong to this Association, countries which often have nothing 
to export except one or more agricultural products. In this connection, 
they emphasize that certain agricultural products from Spain, Greece and 
the Maghreb countries are accorded more favourable treatment than products 
from their own countries. 
47. At the Fiji meeting of the Council of Ministers the ACP States mentioned 
tomatoes and melons as examples and requested that, in accordance with the 
terms of the Lome Convention these ACP products should not be treated less 
favourably than products from third countries. Any discrimination of this 
kind was in clear conflict with the provisions of the Convention and the 
declaration on agricultural products. Furthermore, the ACP felt that the 
possibility of new agricultural products and agricultural exports arising 
made it necessary to have consultations in each individual case to prevent 
difficulties in trade in agricultural products, pursuant to Article 2(2) 
of the Convention. This is an argument to which the Commission has no 
objection. 
48. There were long discussions about the importation of tomatoes from 
Senegal into the Community, this being a new export product for Senegal. 
When the Senegalese representative stressed at the last Joint Committee 
meeting in Maseru the importance of this product for his country's export 
trade, Commissioner Cheysson promised that a satisfactory solution would 
be found by the end of 1977. A solution has been devised in the meantime, 
but whether it is satisfactory is another question. On the basis of the 
Commission proposal of 20 December 1977 the Community decided to import 
as from 1 March of this year tomatoes originating in the ACP countries 
under a Community tariff quota of 1,000 tonnes (at a minimum levy of 2 u.a. 
per 100 kg for the period from 15 November to 15 April) subject to customs 
duties equal to 40% of the Common Customs Tariff rates. The quota of 1,000 
tonnes is not large, and the reduction of the customs duty by 40% does 
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not meet the wishes of Senegal, which had expected a 60% reduction. It 
must he admitted t.ha1: ln L his particular instance the Community has acted 
in an extremely petty fashion, since it can safely be assumed that the 
import of 1,000 tonnes of tomatoes will not have an adverse effect on 
agricultural producer prices in the Community. Moreover, fruit and vegetables 
imported from the ACP countries are normally items that are not in season 
in Europe and thus come on to the European market at a t_ime when they are 
not available fresh in Europe or can only be produced in greenhouses. In 
connection with the import of tomatoes from Senegal the Commission has 
pointed out that the Lome Convention does not offer the ACP countries a 
guarantee with regard to the quantities to be accorded preferential treatment, 
unlike preferences granted under other agreements. The ACP insist, however, 
that the preferences they are granted should in no case be lower than 
preferential rates accorded to third countries or under other agreements. 
7. Trade promotion 
49. 'Trade, not aid' is the most effective way of improving the economic 
situation of the developing countries. Their own efforts are more important 
than any financial assistance. Improved international trade rather than self-
sufficiency and import substitutes, is the answer. 
50. For the developing countries in general and most of the ACP States, whose 
industry, unlike that of the western industrialized countries with their 
market economies, is, with a few rare exceptions, relatively undeveloped and 
mostly very consumer-oriented, exporting is virtually the only way they can 
obtain the funds to buy the industrial products and equipment they need to 
build up their own industry. In this respect, the developing countries are 
far more dependent on external trade than the industrialized countries. But 
it is precisely from the point of view of external trade that the Third World 
is underprivileged in that the goods it has to offer are limited in number and 
quantity and thus hardly in line with the requirements of today's world market. 
The market for traditional export goods from the developing countries can, it 
is true, still be expanded to some extent but not on a scale which would 
compensate for their growing payment commitments and keep pace with the growth 
of international trade. Hence the ACP countries must sell the products of 
their new industries on the EEC market, and they therefore need, if the 
development aid outlined in the Lome Convention is to have any point at all, 
the support of the European Community. 
51. The unsatisfactory development of exports from developing countries is 
principally due to the disadvantageous nature of their supply structure 
inherent in the range of goods they have to offer. Apart from petroleum, 
which for various reasons is not representative of the goods produced by this 
group of countries, agricultural products and raw materials account for the 
- 28 - CA ICP 143fin. 
bulk of Third World exports. The limited success achieved with exports of 
finished products from the developing countries ~ often attributable to a 
lack of know-how with regard to export products. An inadequate knowledge of 
consumer habits, needs and requirements resulting from a lack of market 
research means that manufacturers offer goods on the market which are badly 
designed or not of the required quality. Nor are the marketing channels' and 
sales promotion methods used always the most appropriate, or the price p'olicy 
is at fault. As a result, such products are rejected by traders and consumers. 
52. At the meeting of the council of Ministers in Fiji the ACP countries 
stressed that considerable efforts, going beyond the narrow confines of trade 
events and fairs, would have to be made in the field of trade promotion pnder 
the Lorn~ Convention, since the ACP exports still consisted for the most part 
of primary products and the range of goods was too one-sided. All the partners 
are aware of this problem. 
53. For this reason representatives of the Commission and the ACP States 
discussed the promotion of trade between the Community and the ACP countries 
at a seminar in Brussels on 6 and 7 February 1978. Commissioner Cheysson 
pointed out that the ACP States had been able to step up their exports to the 
Community in the first eight months of 1977 by 28o/o compared with the 
corresponding period the previous year. The ACP countries thus had an 
advantage over the other non-oil-exporting developing countries, whose exports 
in the same period had increased by only 23o/o. Indications that this So/a ~ould 
be achieved had been seen in 1976, when ACP exports increased by 1~/o and 
non~CP exports by 13o/o by comparison with the previous year. The Commissioner 
responsible for development explained at the seminar that the ACP countries 
must aim to increase this lead by skilful marketing and bybu:tllin:Jup and .imp:;011ing 
their production and gearing it to the export market. This would, of c~urse, 
be possible only if a larger proportion of the financial resources provided 
for under the ACP Convention were used for this purpose. In most countries 
this has already been done, about 50o/o of financial aid being used for trade 
promotion. According to the Commission, Kenya, the Ivory Coast, Jamaica, 
Cameroon and Togo in particular have made marked improvements to their export 
structure. 
54. These improvements should not, however, be allowed to obscure the fact 
that considerable efforts are still needed in the field of trade promotion. 
Articles 12 to 15 of the Lorn~ Convention state very precisely what means: and 
methods are to be employed for the improvement of trade promotion. At the 
beginning of the negotiations on the renewal of the Lome Convention it must 
be carefully considered, therefore, to what extent the existing provisions 
have been implemented and whether they are adequate. In any case it is 
certain that for various reasons (lack of planning in certain countries, 
insufficient knowledge of requirements, lack of qualified staff) it has not yet 
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been possible to take full advantage of all the opportunities afforded by the 
Lome convention. 
55. Active trade promotion under the Convention is so important because 
approximately 50% of ACP exports go to the Community. The new Convention will 
therefore have to be geared to ensuring that the ACP countries can make use of 
the advantages provided for in the Convention. since in the next few years 
they will depend above all on European Community support for the sale of their 
products. The technical and financial aid of recent years must be extended 
beyond the purely technical field to cover the commercial aspects in particular. 
A hundred years ago it was said that the flag followed trade; the modern version 
could be that it follows the marketing expert. There is no doubt that exports 
can be considerably increased by the establishment of trade promotion centres, 
marketing offices, production agreements and improved coordination. Above all 
the ACP must ensure that they choose the right products for the market. They 
must improve and expand their natural and traditional products or production 
sectors. Ambitious goals or the development of industries whose counterparts 
in the Community are in difficulties (textiles, shoes, steel) would only lead 
to complications and place an unnecessary burden on relations between the 
Community and the ACP countries. Foreign trade research shows clearly that 
the most successful undertakings are those which are aware of market trends 
and adapt themselves to changing habits of consumption and utilization. 
56. An adequate knowledge of the markets, organization of exhibitions and 
trade fairs and advertizing campaigns is vital. It is therefore necessary to 
proceed from the theoretical principles of marketing research to provide a 
solid basis for the practical considerations. And this must be done in such 
a way that economic operators in the ACP country concerned are provided with a 
ready-made tool. Product, price and advertizing research are important. Of 
particular importance is research into the retail trade since this is the area 
with which market researchers in the developing countries must principally 
contend. Other important aspects are accounting methods, instructions as to 
how a report should be prepared, written and submitted, and finally the setting 
up and organization of market research departments in undertakings. We are 
not concerned here with mere academic exercises but what market researchers 
in the developing countries need : simple accounting procedures, the 
preparation of questionnaires and a usable terminology. The most effective 
development aid that can be given is for the economically developed countries 
to pass on their experience and know-how. There is therefore little sense in 
the EEC constantly referring to the importance of marketing in the ACP 
countries; it would be more to the point to prepare a handbook, a kind of 
'marketing code', covering the most important aspects. For in a society in 
which the consumer has freedom of choice, systematic marketing is an essential 
requirement for trade promotion. 
- 30 - CA/CP/43/fin. 
57. How can demand on the markets be increased? Or, in more practical terms, 
what steps can be taken to stimulate and increase the interest of the European 
import trade (importers, trade, industry) in goods from the ACP countries? 
And how can the suppliers in ACP countries open up the European market? These 
are questions to which a practical answer must be found in the context of trade 
cooperation. 
There are, however, other aspects to be considered, for example specialists 
in export credit or export insurance matters, trade schools, training 
establishments for exporters, etc. The promotion of tourism might also be 
mentioned here, since travel to the developing countries has for them the 
effect of an 'invisible export', as it frequently used to be known. The' 
promotion of tourism is, in a way, also export promotion; in any case, the 
objectives are the same. 
58. The promotion of trade in the ACP countries covers all exports from these 
countries, i.e. exports to the EEC and to third countries and exports among 
the ACP countries themselves, for the importance of the EEC market should not 
allow the ACP countries to forget that the other developing countries also 
represent a market, which for certain goods is even more suitable then the 
Community market. The ACP States are still astonishly ignorant about their 
own markets, and the tendency to introverted development that has been observed 
in the past must be eliminated. If the trade promotion policy is to be 
successful, the right conditions must at the same time be created for mo~e 
favourable market concentrations among the ACP partners. 
59. A word should also be said about the proposed establishment of a European 
c 
agency for trade cooperation with the developing countries. The effects that 
this agency would have on ACP-EEC relations are difficult to foresee. At all 
events every possible effort must be made from the outset to ensure that the 
ACP States do not suffer any disadvantages. This has already been stressed 
by the ACP States at the meeting of the Council of Ministers in Fiji. It is 
true that the functions and responsibilities of this agency coincide wit~ and 
overlap those of the Centre for Industrial Development provided for in the 
Lom~ Convention. Since Article 34 of the Convention provides for specia~ 
trade promotion schemes to improve sales of ACP products on the Community 
market, the setting up of such an agency would mean the existence of two 
institutions in the Community collecting practically the same information but 
competing with one another : the Centre for Industrial Development for th~ 
ACP countries and the trade cooperation agency for the other developing 
countries. The creation of two institutions with similar functions, 
responsibilities and powers would ultimately lead to the institutionalization 
of two separate development and trade policies in the Community. 
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III. Conclusions 
60. Having gained political independence, the developing countries are 
now struggling to achieve economic independence. Although it is true that 
not only the industrial countries benefitted by the economic order of the 
post-war period in terms of expansion of trade and production, it is equally 
true that despite valiant efforts the gross national product per capita 
has risen much faster in the industrialized countries than in the developing 
countries, which is a source of growing concern to the latter. The present 
economic system is based on an international division of labour and is 
aimed at the liberalization of world trade. The fact that the present 
system, or rather the state it is in, is not ideal is mainly due to the 
fact that its basic principles have not been consistently applied. The 
Swedish economist, Gunnar Myrdal, has shown very clearly how the developed 
areas of the world are favoured1 • This should come as no surprise, as it 
is an economic law that capital and labour collect where the greatest profits 
are to be made. This fact, which has been the subject of frequent and 
severe criticism, has nonetheless led to an enormous expansion of world 
trade and the creation of major economic areas, in which, however, the 
developing countries have been able to participate only to a limited degree. 
61. At the top of the list of demands being made by the developing countries is 
therefore the establishment of a new world economic order. This idea of a 'new 
world economic order' was the central theme of the Sixth and Seventh Special 
Sessions of the United Nations, the Fourth UNCTAD Conference in Nairobi 
and the Conference on International Economic Cooperation in Paris (North-
South Dialogue). The way in which 'new world economic order' has become 
a cliche is nothing less than astonishing , as the proposals and demands 
made up to this time have not yet been fused into a single system. 
62. The industrialized and developing countries must agree on a new 
'world order bargain', and this will call for extensive restructuring as 
the final product of carefully planned reforms. Exaggerated demands on the 
one hand and a rigid status quo approach on the other will not produce a 
solution; cooperation, not confrontation, must be the goal. The industrial 
countries must therefore cooperate in establishing a new world order which 
includes all countries and also takes account of problems of interdependence 
as well as actual economic problems. However, the industrial countries 
will be able to offer acceptable ideas on the development of a Third World 
country only when they themselves have worked out a new relationship with 
Third World countries in general. The developing countries must be enabled 
to produce, as part of a world economy organized on the principle of optimal 
use of resources, for the standard of living of their populations to be 
constantly improved and for a self-perpetuating development process to be 
set in motion. The industrial and developing countries must therefore con-
centrate on practical development problems, which, although characteristic, 
may vary from country to country. 
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Gunnar Myrdal, 'Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Regions; 1974 
63. Forms of cooperation must be devised or developed that will make for 
a suitable and permanent balance between the interests of underdeveloped 
and developed countries and enable the developing countries to meet their 
basic needs. It is not a question of working out a theoretical new world 
economic order: it is far more important and more efficient to integrate 
the developing countries straight away as equal partners into the world · 
economic process. If this is done, the new economic order will come about 
of its own accord. The economic dependence of the developing countries 
must be overcome, or, in other words, unilateral dependence must be replaced 
by mutual dependence. The goal must be an irlentity of interests that will 
transform the peripheral role of the developing countries into genuine 
partnership. If this is to be achieved, we must start by granting 
the weaker partner special rights and privileges. If we overcome the 
barriers to development by means of a 4onscientious development policy, we 
shall also have solved the problems of raw material prices and terms of 
trade by attacking them at their very roots. The developing countries can 
then proceed to diversify their production and break into the processing 
sector. Supplies of raw materials would increase more slowly, with the 
result that prices would tend to rise and the terms of trade would improve. 
64. If the goal has not yet been reached, this does not mean that the course 
steered has been the wrong one entirely. It is just that it was not consist-
ently followed. The industrial countries have often made mistakes because 
of short-sighted egoism or inexperience. Above all, however, they have 
simply not tried hard enough so far. The criticisms voiced in the Pearson 
Report of 1969 are still true of the situation today, but safficient attention 
has not been paid to them. In fairness it must also be said that the 
developing countries have made basic mistakes in their development planning, 
and all the blame for the present malaise cannot be laid at the door of the 
existing world economic order. 
65. The industrial countries must help the developing countries more than 
heretofore by providing capital, advice and training and above all by opening 
their markets to the products of the developing countries. It is obvious 
to anyone who knows the situation of the developing countries that trade 
policy measures, particularly in the area of import liberalization, are 
often much more important for the development process than direct aid, 
however generous. The industrial countries must therefore orientate their 
structural policies in such a way that the opening of their markets does 
not come up against insurmountable domestic policy obstacles. 
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66. While acknowledging the merits of the Lome Convention, care must be 
taken in future, particularly with regard to Lome II. to promote more 
vigorously than heretofore the ACP countries' trade oppo~·tunities because 
this is one of the most important points of departure for an improvement 
in their economic position. The emphasis should be placed mainly on the 
following aspects: 
non-tariff barriers to trade, a serious obstacle to trade, must be 
eliminated; 
- excise duties on tropic2l products should be removed; 
- special efforts-are needed to facilitate access to Community markets for 
the agricultural products from its partner countries; 
- generous solutions should also be worked out even for sensitive products 
that compete with EEC products. 
67. The ACP countries should be given every possible help to enable them 
to make better use of the opportunities to promote sales afforded by the 
Lome Convention, since Community markets are of vital importance for the 
development of the ACP countries. It is not sufficient merely to throw 
open the markets. The example of the banana sector makes it abundantly 
clear how market opportunities are exploited mainly by the countries with 
the best export structures. Side by side with actualtrade measures system-
atic steps must therefore be taken to improve the export structures of the 
ACP countries. It is important that the Community's partners improve their 
distribution networks, so as to facilitate access for their products to 
the Community market. In addition to the actual marketing measures, care 
must be taken when negotiating Lome II to find the most advantageous solutior. 
for certain trade sectors. In view of the difficulties encountered by 
certain products, which have been described in detail in this report, 
thought should also be given to the question of what new provisions might 
be enacted in the form of protocols on given products. With a view to 
improving sales of certain specific products it might also be advisable 
to conclude ad hoc agreements. In any case, such agreements as are concluded 
m~t be useful and not merely a means of salving the consciences of some 
of those party to them. 
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68. When the new Association Agreement is negotiated, it must be ensured 
from the very outset that the ACP are accorded sales guarantees for certain 
products, as no amount of technical and financial aid and no account of 
improvement in infrastructures and agricultural structures will be of apy 
avail, if every time an economic difficulty occurs, the Community market 
is walled off for certain products. It was a serious blow to many develop-
ing countries when restrictions were last year placed on textile imports 
into the Community. In times of stagnation or recession adjustment problems 
are certainly greater, especially where sensitive products are concerned, 
but no matter what measures are taken, the legitimate interests of the 
associated partners must never be overlooked. The Community should once 
and for all initiate a consistent policy of restructuring measures, so 
that the production of goods that enjoy advantages in the ACP countries. 
as regards location and production costs can be expanded. In this cont-ext, 
for example, the expansion of sugar production in the EEC must be seen as 
completely illogical. The Community should therefore cut back its sugarbeet 
cultivation and leave sugar-exporting to the developing countries. If 
exports of cane sugar are already giving rise to difficulties, what obstacles 
will have to be overcome when the ACP step up exports of their industrial 
products? An important element in any sound development policy is to 
devise new forms of division of labour between industrialized and developing 
countries. Can the European Community's sugar policy be regarded as a 
constructive contribution to a new international division of labour? 
69. Lome II should also provide for some machinery whereby there can be 
consultation between the EEC and the ACP, to determine what products 
give the ACP the best long-term chance on the Community market. In this 
system there is supposed to be no recourse to safeguard clauses, but the 
planned 'obligatory and periodic consultations' on the production plans 
of the ACP and the structural problems of the EEC could also involve or , 
re~ult in a kind of disguised protectionism. It would seem wise, therefore~ 
for the utmost care to be exercised at the forthcoming nego~iations, as ~here 
is a danger that the ACP countries will be persuaded not to undertake 
further investments and further expansion of production in those areas in 
which they are just now beginning to attain a competitive position. How. 
machinery of this kind might be reconciled with a liberal trade system ~s 
a question that must remain open. At any rate, it must not be allowed to 
come to a situation in which the ACP produce only such goods as suit the 
European Community's economic and structural policy. 
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